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Abstract We consider a noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game which is asso-
ciated with an infinitesimal generator of a stochastically perturbed multi-channel dynamical
system – where, in the course of such a game, each player attempts to minimize the asymp-
totic rate with which the controlled state trajectory of the system exits from a given bounded
open domain. In particular, we show the existence of a Nash-equilibrium point (i.e., an
n-tuple of equilibrium linear feedback operators) that is distinctly related to a unique max-
imum closed invariant set of the corresponding deterministic multi-channel dynamical sys-
tem, when the latter is composed with this n-tuple of equilibrium linear feedback operators.
Keywords Asymptotic exit rate · diffusion equation · principal eigenvalue · infinitesimal
generator · multi-channel dynamical systems · Nash equilibrium · noncooperative game
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game which is as-
sociated with an infinitesimal generator pertaining to the following stochastically perturbed
multi-channel dynamical system1
dxǫ(t) = Axǫ(t)dt+
∑n
i=1
Biui(t)dt+
√
ǫσ(xǫ(t))dW (t), xǫ(0) = x0, (1)
where
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1 e.g., see [2] for additional discussion on multi-channel dynamical systems without random perturbation
terms.
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- A ∈ Rd×d, Bi ∈ Rd×ri , ǫ is a small positive number (which represents the level of
random perturbation in the system),
- σ : Rd → Rd×d is Lipschitz with the least eigenvalue of σ(·)σT (·) uniformly bounded
away from zero, i.e.,
σ(x)σT (x) ≥ κId×d, ∀x ∈ Rd,
for some κ > 0,
- W (·) is a d-dimensional standard Wiener process,
- xǫ(·) ∈ X ⊆ Rd is the state trajectory of the system,
- ui(·) is a Ui-valued measurable control process to the ith-channel (i.e., an admissible
control from the measurable set Ui ⊂ Rri ) such that for all t > s, W (t) −W (s) is
independent of ui(ν) for ν ≤ s and∫ t1
0
|ui(t)|2dt <∞, ∀t1 ≥ 0,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let D ⊂ Rd be a bounded open domain with smooth boundary (i.e., ∂D is a manifold of
class C2). Moreover, denote by C0T ([0, T ],Rd) the space of all continuous functions ϕ(t),
t ∈ [0, T ], with range in Rd; and, in this space, we define the following metric
ρ0T (ϕ,ψ) = sup
t∈[0, T ]
∣∣∣ϕ(t)− ψ(t)∣∣∣, (2)
when ϕ(t), ψ(t) belong to C0T ([0, T ],Rd). If Φ is a subset of the space C0T ([0, T ],Rd),
then we define
d0T (ψ,Φ) = sup
ϕ∈Φ
ρ0T (ψ(t), ϕ(t)). (3)
In what follows, we consider a particular class of admissible controls ui(·) ∈ Ui of the form
ui(t) =
(Kixǫ)(t), ∀t ≥ 0, where Ki, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, is a real, continuous ri × d
matrix function such that
K ⊆
{(K1,K2, . . . ,Kn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,K
∈
∏n
i=1
Ki[X ,Ui]
∣∣∣∣ φ(t; 0, x0, (Kx0)(t)) ∈ Ω,
∀t ≥ 0, ∀x0 ∈ Ω
}
, (4)
where Ki[X ,Ui] is a closed subspace of bounded linear feedback operators from X to Ui,
Ω is a bounded open set which is contained in D ∪ ∂D; and φ(t; 0, x0, (Kx0)(t)) is the
unique solution for
x˙0(t) = Ax0(t) +
∑n
i=1
Bi
(Kix0)(t), x0(0) = x0 ∈ Ω, (5)
that corresponds to the deterministic multi-channel dynamical system, when ǫ = 0.
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Further, the infinitesimal generator pertaining to the diffusion process xǫ(t) of Equation (1),
with ui(t) =
(Kixǫ)(t), for t ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2, . . . , n, is given by
LKǫ (·)(x) =
〈
▽(·),
(
Ax+
(
B,K)x)〉+ ǫ
2
tr
{
σ(x)σT (x)▽2 (·)
}
, (6)
where
(
B,K)x(·) =∑ni=1Bi(Kix)(·) for all t ≥ 0.
For any fixed K ∈ K and ǫ > 0, let τ ǫD be the first exit-time from the domain D for the
diffusion process xǫ(t), i.e.,
τ ǫD = inf
{
t > 0
∣∣xǫ(t) /∈ D}, (7)
which also depends on the class of linear feedback operators K and, in particular, on the be-
havior of the solutions to the deterministic dynamical system in Equation (5). Moreover, let
us denote by λKǫ the principal eigenvalue of the infinitesimal generator −LKǫ corresponding
to a zero boundary condition on ∂D which is given by
λKǫ = − lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logPKǫ
{
τ ǫD > T
}
, (8)
where the probability PKǫ
{·} is conditioned on the initial point x0 ∈ D as well as on the
class of linear feedback operators K .
Next, let us introduce the following definition (i.e., the maximum closed invariant set for
the deterministic dynamical system of Equation (5) under the action of the class of linear
feedback operators K ) which is useful in the sequel.
Definition 1 A set ΛKD ⊂ D ∪ ∂D is called a maximum closed invariant set (under the
action of an n-tuple of linear feedback operators with respect to the deterministic dynamical
system), if any set Ω ⊂ D ∪ ∂D, for some K ∈ K , satisfying the property
φ
(
t; 0, x0, (Kx0)(t)
) ∈ Ω, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀x0 ∈ Ω (9)
is a subset of ΛKD .2
In Section 2, we introduce a noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game – where,
in the course of such a game, each player attempts to minimize a cost criterion related to
the asymptotic rate with which the controlled state trajectory of the dynamical system of
Equation (1) exits from the given bounded open domain D. To be specific, we use a cost
criterion that is directly related to minimizing the principal eigenvalue of the infinitesimal
generator
Ki[X ,Ui] ∋ Ki 7→ λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, (10)
2 Such an invariant set is closed (and it may also be an empty set). Note that the solution
φ
(
t; 0, x0, (Kx0)(t)
)
corresponds to the deterministic dynamical system, i.e.,
x˙0t = Ax
0(t) +
∑n
i=1
Bi
(Kix0
)
(t), ∀x0 ∈ Ω,
when such a system is composed with an n-tuple of linear feedback operators K ∈ K .
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with respect to the admissible controls ui(·) ∈ Ui of the form ui(t) =
(Kixǫ)(t), for
t ≥ 0, where Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui] for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n; while the others K∗¬i remain fixed.3
Note that if the domain D contains an equilibrium point for the deterministic dynamical
system of Equation (5) (i.e., under the action of the class of linear feedback operators K ).
Then, the asymptotic behavior of the principal eigenvalue tends to zero exponentially as
ǫ → 0 (e.g., see [13], [12] or [3]). On the other hand, if the maximum closed invariant set
Λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ⊂ D∪∂D (under the action of (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K with respect to the deterministic
dynamical system) is nonempty, then the following asymptotic condition holds
− lim
ǫ→0
lim sup
T→∞
ǫ
T
logP
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}
<∞, x0 ∈ D, (11)
where τ ǫD,i the exit time with respect to the ith-channel and (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i =
1, 2, . . . n. Later, such a connection between the existence of the maximum closed invariant
sets Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ⊂ D ∪ ∂D, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, for the dynamical system of Equa-
tion (5) and the asymptotic behavior of the principal eigenvalue of the infinitesimal generator
−LKǫ (which corresponds to a zero boundary condition on ∂D) allows us to provide some
results on the existence of a Nash-equilibrium point (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗n) ∈ K in a game-
theoretic setting (cf. Definition 2 for the definition of Nash-equilibrium points).
Here, it is worth remaking that the principal eigenvalue λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i (for a particular (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈
K ) is the boundary value between thoseR < ri(Ki,K∗¬i) for whichE(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp(ǫ−1Rτ ǫD,i)
}
< ∞ and those R > ri(Ki,K∗¬i) for which E(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp(ǫ−1Rτ ǫD,i)
}
= ∞, where
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) is given by the following4
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) = lim sup
T→∞
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
1
T
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D ∪ ∂D, t ∈ [0, T ]},
(12)
with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . n.
Note that, in general, such an asymptotic analysis involves minimizing the following action
functional
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t)) =
1
2
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥dϕ(t)dt −
(
Aϕ(t) +
(
B, (Ki,K∗¬i)
)
ϕ(t)
)∥∥∥∥2dt, (13)
where∥∥∥∥dϕ(t)dt −
(
Aϕ(t) +
(
B, (Ki,K∗¬i)
)
ϕ(t)
)∥∥∥∥2 =
[
dϕ(t)
dt
−
(
Aϕ(t) +
(
B, (Ki,K∗¬i)
)
ϕ(t)
)]T
×
(
σ(ϕ(t))σT (ϕ(t))
)−1[dϕ(t)
dt
−
(
Aϕ(t) +
(
B, (Ki,K∗¬i)
)
ϕ(t)
)]
,
(14)
3 (Ki,K∗¬i) ,
(K∗1 , . . . ,K∗i−1,Ki,K∗i+1, . . . ,K∗n
)
.
4 Note that the asymptotic behavior of
(
ǫ/T
)
log P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i)
ǫ,i
{
τǫD,i > T
}
, for each i = 1, 2, . . . n, as
ǫ→ 0 and T →∞, determines whether the deterministic dynamical system in Equation (5) has a maximum
closed invariant set in D ∪ ∂D or not.
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with
(
B, (Ki,K∗¬i)
)
ϕ(t) = Bi
(Kiϕ)(t) +∑j 6=i Bj(K∗jϕ)(t), for each i = 1, 2, . . . n,
and where ϕ(t) ∈ C0T ([0, T ],Rd) is absolutely continuous.
In the remainder of this section, we state the following lemmas that will be useful for proving
our main results (see [12, Theorem 1.1, Theorem 1.2 and Lemma 9.1] or [14]; and see [7,
pp. 332–340] for additional discussions).
Lemma 1 For any α > 0, δ > 0 and γ > 0, there exists an ǫ0 > 0 such that
(i)
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
ρ0T
(
xǫ(t), ϕ(t)
)
< δ
}
≥ exp
{
−ǫ−1(S(Ki,K∗¬i)0T (ϕ(t)) + γ)}, ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0),
(15)
where ϕ(t) is any function in C0T ([0, T ],Rd) for which S(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t)) < α and
ϕ(0) = x0; and
(ii)
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
ρ0T
(
xǫ(t), Φ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
x0,α
) ≥ δ} ≤ exp{−ǫ−1(α− γ)}, ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0),
(16)
where
Φ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
x0,α =
{
ϕ(t) ∈ C0T ([0, T ],Rd)
∣∣∣ϕ(0) = x0 S(Ki,K∗¬i)0T (ϕ(t)) < α}. (17)
where (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Lemma 2 Let D+δ denote a δ-neighborhood of D and let D−δ denote the set of points in
D at a distance greater than δ from the boundary ∂D. Then, for sufficiently small δ > 0,
the following estimates
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D+δ ∪ ∂D+δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}, (18)
with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D−δ ∪ ∂D−δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}, (19)
can be made arbitrarily close to each other. Furthermore, the same holds for
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x,ϕ(T )=y
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D±δ ∪ ∂D±δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}, (20)
uniformly for any x, y ∈ D−δ.
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Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that the asymptotic behavior for sin-
gularly perturbed eigenvalue is related to the problem of estimating the minimum asymptotic
exit rate with which the state trajectories xǫ(t) exit from the domain D. For example, for
sufficiently small ǫ > 0, the asymptotic behavior of the principal eigenvalue for the in-
finitesimal generator (corresponding to a zero boundary condition on ∂D) has been studied
in the past (e.g., see [3] or [6] in the context of an asymptotic behavior for the principal
eigenfunction; and see [9], [10] or [4] in the context of an asymptotic behavior for the equi-
librium density). Specifically, the authors in [4] and [9] have provided some results about
the regularity properties of the action functional in connection with the asymptotic behavior
of the equilibrium density, where the latter (i.e., the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium
density) is linked with the exit problem from the domain of attraction with an exponentially
stable critical point for the stochastically perturbed dynamical system (see also [11] and
[5]).
2 Main Results
In this section, we present our main results – where we provide a sufficient condition
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for the noncooperative n-player principal
eigenvalue game. Specifically, in the course of such a game, each player generates auto-
matically an admissible control strategy in response to the action of other players via the
system state trajectory xǫ(t) for t ≥ 0. For example, the ith-player can generate an ad-
missible control strategy ui(t) =
(Kixǫ)(t) in response to the actions of other players
u∗j (t) =
(K∗jxǫ)(t), for j 6= i, with i = 1, 2, . . . , n (where the admissible control strate-
gies
(
̂ui(·), u∗¬i(·)
) ∈ ∏ni=1 Ui for almost all t ≥ 0).5 Moreover, for such a game to have
a stable Nash equilibrium point (which is also robust to small perturbations in the strategies
played by the other players), then each player is required to respond optimally (in some
sense of best-response correspondences) to the actions of the other players.
To this end, it will be useful to consider the following criterion functions (cf. Equation (12)
or Equation (10))
Ki[X ,Ui] ∋ Ki 7→ ri(Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ R− ∪ {−∞}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (21)
with respect to the admissible controls ui(·) ∈ Ui of the form ui(t) =
(Kixǫ)(t), for t ≥ 0,
whereKi ∈ Ki[X ,Ui] for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n; while the othersK∗¬i remain fixed.6 On the
other hand, under the game-theoretic setting, if we further assume that the n-tuple of linear
feedback operators K∗ , (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗n) ∈ K is a Nash equilibrium point. Then, when
all players play simultaneously their Nash strategies u∗i (t) =
(K∗i xǫ)(t) for all t ≥ 0, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, there exist a unique maximum closed invariant set ΛK
∗
D ⊂ D ∪ ∂D that
contains all closed invariant sets from the set D ∪ ∂D (under the action of the n-tuple of
equilibrium linear feedback operators with respect to the unperturbed multi-channel dynam-
ical system) i.e., Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ⊆ ΛK
∗
D , ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Our interest
in this section is to investigate the connection between the Nash equilibrium point and the
maximum closed invariant set, and provide a sufficient condition for the existence of Nash
5 ( ̂ui(t), u∗¬i(t)
)
,
(
u∗1(t), . . . u
∗
i−1(t), ui(t), u
∗
i+1(t), . . . u
∗
n(t)
)
.
6 Notice that such criterion function is upper-semicontinuous and always achieves its extremum over a
nonempty closed subset
∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui].
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equilibrium point for the noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game (where such a
game-theoretic setting further involves some information on the infinitesimal generator of
the stochastically perturbed multi-channel dynamical system).7
Therefore, more formally, we have the following definition for the Nash equilibrium point
(i.e., the n-tuple of equilibrium linear feedback operators).
Definition 2 The n-tuple (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗n) ∈ K (i.e., the n-tuple of equilibrium linear
feedback operators) is called a Nash equilibrium point for the principal eigenvalue game if
it satisfies
ri
(K∗i ,K∗¬i) ≤ ri(Ki,K∗¬i), ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (22)
with
(Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . n.
Proposition 1 If, for some x0 ∈ D, one of the following conditions hold
(i)
lim
ǫ→0
lim sup
T→∞
ǫ
T
log P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}
> −∞, (23)
(ii)
lim
ǫ→0
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i
}
=∞, (24)
where τ ǫD,i is the exit-time with respect to the ith-channel and (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, the maximum closed invariant setΛ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D for the dynamical system
in Equation (5) is nonempty.
Then, we have the following proposition which is a direct consequence of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the class of linear feedback operators K is nonempty. Then,
the principal eigenvalue λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i corresponding to the infinitesimal generator L(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ
with zero boundary condition on ∂D satisfies
λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i = ǫ
−1ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + o(ǫ−1) as ǫ→ 0, (25)
where
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) = lim sup
T→∞
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
1
T
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D ∪ ∂D, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]},
(26)
with
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t)) =
1
2
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥dϕ(t)dt − (A+ (B, (Ki,K∗¬i))ϕ)(t)
∥∥∥∥2dt
and (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
7 Note that such a connection is also implicitly related with the problem of maximizing the mean exit time
for the controlled state trajectory from the region D.
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The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equi-
librium point for the noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the mapping Ki[X ,Ui] ∋ Ki 7→ ri(Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ R+ ∪{∞} is
upper-semicontinuous. Then, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium point that satisfies
ri(K∗i ,K∗¬i) ≤ ri(Ki,K∗¬i), ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (27)
where
K∗i ∈ argmin
Ki∈Ki[X ,Ui]
{
lim sup
T→∞
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
1
T
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D ∪ ∂D,
∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}}
,
(28)
with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . n.
Furthermore, the maximum closed invariant set ΛK
∗
D ⊂ D ∪ ∂D (under the action of the
n-tuple of equilibrium linear feedback operators (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗n) ∈ K with respect to
the unperturbed multi-channel dynamical system) satisfies
Λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ⊂ ΛK
∗
D , ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (29)
with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i = 1, 2, . . . n.
3 Proof of the Main Results
3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For a fixed i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, suppose that the maximum closed invariant set Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ,
with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K , is empty. Then, there exists an open bounded domain D˜ ⊃ D ∪ ∂D
such that the corresponding set Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D˜
is also empty.
Note that it is easy to check that if D2 ⊂ D1, then Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D2
⊂ Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D1
. Take the
following sequence
{
Dm
}
of open domains such that
D1 ⊃ D2 ⊃ D3 ⊃ · · · and
⋂
m≥1
Dm = D ∪ ∂D. (30)
If Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
Dm
6= ∅ for all m ≥ 1, then
Λ =
⋂
m≥1
Λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
Dm
. (31)
Moreover, since Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
Dm
is closed, we have
Λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D1
⊃ Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D2
⊃ Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D3
⊃ · · · . (32)
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Note that Λ is an invariant closed set with respect to the unperturbed multi-channel dynam-
ical system and Λ ⊃ D ∪ ∂D. Thus, ∅ 6= Λ ⊂ Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D . This contradicts our earlier
assumption. Then, for some m0 ≥ 1, we have
Λ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
Dm0
= ∅. (33)
Let D˜ = Dm0 and, for any x0 ∈ D˜ ∪ ∂D˜, let us introduce the following
τ0
D˜,i
= inf
{
t > 0
∣∣x0(t) /∈ D˜ ∪ ∂D˜}, (34)
with respect to (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then, we can show that
τ0
D˜,i
<∞, (35)
for any x0 ∈ D˜ ∪ ∂D˜. Note that, if τ0D˜,i = ∞, then φ
(
t; 0, x0, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(t)
) ∈
D˜ ∪ ∂D˜ for all t ≥ 0. Then, for some sequence tm → ∞ and a point y ∈ D˜ ∪ ∂D˜, we
have
φ
(
tm; 0, x0, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(tn)
)→ y as tm →∞ (36)
and
φ
(
(tm + t); 0, x0, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(tm + t)
)→ φ((t; tm, y, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(t)), (37)
for any t ∈ [0,∞).
Thus, if φ
(
t; tm, y, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(t)
) ∈ D˜ ∪ ∂D˜ for all t ∈ [0,∞), then we have the
following {
φ
(
(t; tm, y, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(t)
)
, t ≥ 0
}
⊂ Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D˜
= ∅, (38)
which show that τ0
D˜,i
is finite.
Note that, from upper-semicontinuity of τ0
D˜,i
, we have
T˜ = sup
x0∈D˜∪∂D˜
τ0
D˜,i
<∞. (39)
Moreover, for any δ > 0, let8
lim
ǫ→0
sup
x0∈D
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
ρ(xǫ(t), φ
(
t; 0, x0, ( ̂Kix0,K∗¬ix0)(t)
)
) > δ
}
= 0, t ≥ 0. (40)
From Equations (34)–(41), we have
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T˜
}→ 0 as ǫ→ 0. (41)
8 Here the diffusion process xǫ(t) is described by the following stochastic differential equation
dxǫ(t) = Axǫ(t)dt +Bi(Kixǫ)(t)dt +
∑
j 6=i
Bj(K∗jxǫ)(t) +
√
ǫσ(xǫ(t))dW (t), xǫ(0) = x0.
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Then, using the Markov property, we have
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > ℓT˜
}
= E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i χτǫ
D,i
>T˜E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i χτǫ
D,i
>T˜ · · ·E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i χτǫ
D,i
>T˜ ,
≤
(
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T˜
})ℓ
, (42)
where χA is the indicator for the event A.
Since P(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}
decreases in T , then we have
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logP
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
} ≤ 1
T˜
logP
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T˜
}
. (43)
Taking into account Equation (42), then, for any x0 ∈ D, we have the following
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logP
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}→ −∞ as ǫ→ 0. (44)
Hence, our assumption that Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D = ∅ is inconsistent.
To proof the part (ii), notice that
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i
} ≤ T˜∑∞
ℓ=1
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > (ℓ− 1)T˜
}
. (45)
Assumption Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D = ∅ gives, in view of Equations (41), (42) and (45) for sufficiently
small ǫ > 0 and for any x0 ∈ D, that
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i
} ≤ T˜∑∞
ℓ=1
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > (m− 1)T˜
}
,
<∞, (46)
which contradicts with Equation (23). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ✷
3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For a fixed i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, suppose that ri(Ki,K∗¬i), with (Ki,K∗¬i) ∈ K , exists.9
Then, using Lemma 2, one can show that ri(Ki,K∗¬i) also satisfies the following
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) = sup
x,y∈D
{
lim sup
T→∞
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x,ϕ(T )=y
1
T
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D ∪ ∂D,
∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}}
. (47)
9 Note that the existence of such a limit for ri(Ki,K∗¬i) can be easily established (e.g., see [12]).
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Next, let us show that, for sufficiently small ǫ > 0, E(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp(ǫ−1Rτ ǫD,i)
}
tends to
infinity, when R > ri(Ki,K∗¬i). If we choose a positive κ which is smaller than (R −
ri(Ki,K∗¬i))/3 so that
sup
x,y∈D
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x,ϕ(T )=y
1
T
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D ∪ ∂D, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}
< ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + κ, (48)
and, for sufficiently small δ > 0,
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x,ϕ(T )=y
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D−δ ∪ ∂D−δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}
< T
(
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 2κ
)
, (49)
for all x, y ∈ D−δ. Then, if we further let α = T
(
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 2κ
)
and γ = Tκ, from
Lemma 1, there exits an ǫ0 > 0 such that
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t)) ≤ T
(
ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 2κ
)
, ϕ(t) ∈ D−δ ∪ ∂D−δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (50)
for any x, y ∈ D−δ; and, moreover, we have the following probability estimate
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD−δ,i > T, x
ǫ(τ ǫD−δ,i) ∈ D−δ
}
≥ P(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
ρ0T
(
xǫ(t), ϕ(t)
)
< δ
}
,
≥ exp(−ǫ−1(S(Ki,K∗¬i)0T (ϕ(t)) + γ)),
≥ exp(−ǫ−1T(ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 3κ)),
∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), (51)
where ϕ(T ) ∈ D−2δ.
Let us define the following random events
Aℓ =
{
τ ǫD−δ,i > ℓT, x
ǫ(ℓT ) ∈ D−δ
}
, (52)
for ℓ ∈ N+ ∪ {0}. Then, from the Markov property, we have
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{Aℓ} ≥ E(Ki,K∗¬i)ǫ,i χAℓ−1P(Ki,K∗¬i)(ǫ,x(ℓ−1)T ){A1},
≥ P(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{Aℓ−1} inf
y∈D−δ
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
(ǫ,y)
{A1},
≥ exp(−ǫ−1ℓT(ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 3κ)) ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). (53)
Note that, for an arbitrary ℓ, we have the following
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp
(
ǫ−1Rτ ǫD−δ,i
)} ≥ exp(ǫ−1RℓT)P(Ki,K∗¬i)ǫ,i {τ ǫD−δ,i > ℓT},
≥ exp(−ǫ−1ℓT(R− ri(Ki,K∗¬i)− 3κ)), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0),
(54)
which tends to infinity as ℓ→∞, i.e., E(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp
(
ǫ−1Rτ ǫD−δ,i
)}
=∞.
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On the other hand, let us show that if R < ri(Ki,K∗¬i), then, for sufficiently small ǫ > 0,
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp
(
ǫ−1Rτ ǫD−δ,i
)}
< ∞. For κ < (R − ri(Ki,K∗¬i))/3, let us choose δ so
that
inf
ϕ(t)∈C0T ([0,T ],R
d)
ϕ(0)=x0
{
S
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
0T (ϕ(t))
∣∣∣ϕ(t) ∈ D+δ ∪ ∂D+δ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}
> T
(
ri(Ki,K∗¬i)− 2κ
)
. (55)
From Lemma 1, with α = T
(
ri(Ki,K∗¬i)−2κ
)
and γTκ, there exists an ǫ0 > 0 such that
the distance between the set of functions ψ(t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , entirely lying in D and any
of the sets Φ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
x0,α is at least a distance δ; and, hence, we have the following probability
estimate
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}
≤ P(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
d0T
(
xǫ(t), Φ
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
x0,α
) ≥ δ},
≤ exp(−ǫ−1T(ri(Ki,K∗¬i)− 3κ)), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), (56)
for any x ∈ D.
Then, using the Markov property, we have the following
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > ℓT
}
≤ exp(−ǫ−1ℓT(ri(Ki,K∗¬i)− 3κ)), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), (57)
and
E
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp
(
ǫ−1Rτ ǫD,i
)}
≤
∑∞
ℓ=0
exp
(
ǫ−1R(ℓ+ 1)T
)
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
ℓT < τ ǫD,i ≤ (ℓ+ 1)T
}
,
≤
∑∞
ℓ=0
exp
(
ǫ−1R(ℓ+ 1)T
)
P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > ℓT
}
,
≤
∑∞
ℓ=0
exp
(
ǫ−1RT
)
exp
(−ǫ−1ℓT(R− ri(Ki,K∗¬i) + 3κ)), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0),
(58)
which converges to a finite value, i.e.,P(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp
(
ǫ−1Rτ ǫD,i
)}
<∞. Hence, ri(Ki,K∗¬i)
is a boundary for which E(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
exp(ǫ−1ri(Ki,K∗¬i)τ ǫD,i)
}
is finite. Then, from Equa-
tion (35) (cf. Equation(31)), we have
− 1
T
log P
(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i
{
τ ǫD,i > T
}
≤ ǫ−1(ri(Ki,K∗¬i)− 3κ), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), (59)
for any x ∈ D, where the left side tends to the principal eigenvalue λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
ǫ,i as T → ∞.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ✷
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3.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this proposition, we use the Ekeland’s variational principle for equilibrium prob-
lems (e.g., see [1]). To this end, for some x0 ∈ D, let us introduce the following auxiliary
mapping ̺ :
∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]×
∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]→ R− ∪ {−∞}, i.e.,(K∗,K) 7→ ̺(K∗,K) ,∑n
i=1
{
ri(K∗i ,K∗¬i)− ri(Ki,K∗¬i)
}
, (60)
which is lower-semicontinuous with respect to K = (Ki,K¬i) ∈
∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui] and it
also satisfies the following
̺(K∗,K) ≤ ̺(K∗, K˜) + ̺(K˜,K), ∀K∗,K, K˜ ∈
∏n
i=1
Ki[X ,Ui], (61)
with K˜ = (K˜i, K˜∗¬i) ∈
∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]. Moreover, for each ℓ ∈ N+, ifK(ℓ) = (K(ℓ)i ,K∗¬i(ℓ)) ∈∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui] is an ε-equilibrium point.10 Then, we have
̺(K∗,K(ℓ)) ≥ −ε∥∥K∗ −K(ℓ)∥∥2∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]
, ∀K(ℓ) ∈
∏n
i=1
Ki[X ,Ui]. (62)
Notice that ̺(K∗, .) is upper-semicontinuous for everyK from the closed set∏ni=1 Ki[X ,Ui],
then we can choose a subsequence
{K(ℓk)} of {K(ℓ)} such that K(ℓk) → K∗ as k → ∞.
Hence, we have
lim inf
k→∞
(
̺(K∗,K(ℓk)) + εk
∥∥K∗ −K(ℓk)∥∥2∏n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]
)
= 0, (63)
and thereby provides K∗ ∈∏ni=1 Ki[X ,Ui] is a fixed-point for the mapping ̺(K∗,K), i.e.,
infK∈
∏
n
i=1 Ki[X ,Ui]
̺(K∗,K) = ̺(K∗,K∗), such that
ri(K∗i ,K∗¬i) ≤ ri(Ki,K∗¬i), ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (64)
which shows that K∗ = (K∗1,K∗2, . . . ,K∗n) ∈ K is indeed a Nash equilibrium point for the
noncooperative n-player principal eigenvalue game.11 With the admissible control strategies
u∗i (·) =
(K∗i xǫ)(·), ∀t ≥ 0, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the maximum closed invariant set
ΛK
∗
D ⊂ D ∪ ∂D contains all closed invariant sets from the set D ∪ ∂D (under the action of
the n-tuple of equilibrium linear feedback operators with respect to the unperturbed multi-
channel dynamical system) i.e., Λ(Ki,K
∗
¬i
)
D ⊂ ΛK
∗
D , ∀Ki ∈ Ki[X ,Ui], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(see also Proposition 1). This completes the proof of Proposition 3. ✷
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